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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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COUNTRY	Rumania		REPORT NO.			
SUBJECT	 Atomic Defense Training in the Rumanian Air Force Inter-Satellite Early Warn 		DATE DISTR.	9 Se	ptember 1955	
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- 4. Source remembers only the following information on the topics given below:
 - a. Methods of defense: Protection against atomic radiation and concussion by lying face downward away from the point of detonation and taking advantage of any shelter or obstacle which could serve as a shield.
 - b. Types of bombs: No physical or technical descriptions of bombs were given but A-bombs were broken down into three categories, i.e., small, medium, and large. Theoretical schematic illustrations compared the different sizes of bombs to their effective radius of damage.
 - c. Effect of A-bombs: Its destructive power and influence on human morale.
 - d. First aid: Decontamination, basic medical treatment for shock, medication of wounds, and nourishment of atomic casualties. Source was unable to give any further information on first aid.
 - e. Theoretical construction of A-bomb shelters for personnel and material: Sketches of basic shelter types were drawn on the lecture-room black-board. See page 4 for source's memory sketch of these shelters.
 - f. Use of protective clothing (gloves, impregnated clothes, masks, etc): Source never saw any such equipment but heard that it was available.
- 5. Although attendance at these lectures was mandatory, personnel were generally disinterested in the program; these lectures served only as a period of relaxation. Officers to whom the atomic defense pamphlet was available never showed a serious interest in examining or studying it. Source, with a similar lack of enthusiasm, never took the opportunity to read the pamphlet. He believes that this apathetic attitude was prevalent throughout the Rumanian Air Force.

during one of the last lectures on atomic defense which , air force personnel were told that more emphasis was to be placed on atomic defense programs in the near future. This statement was based on a directive issued by Secretary of Defense Bodnaras. The need for expanding this training program was based on the alleged probability of the US and England starting an atomic war. Source claims that many officers and civilians with whom he talked expressed the opinion that although the Rumanian Government believed that the USSR would extend protection to Rumania against atomic attack, this confidence was not generally shared by the Rumanian people.

Source heard in one lecture that a "model" military training area (polygon) for atomic defense was located near Bucharest and that another training area was to be built in the vicinity of Constanta. I Activities 50X1 ion against atomic attack and related exercises. However, source could area.

Inter-Satellite Early Warning Systems

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could not judge the effectiveness of Rumanian communication inter-Satellite early warning systems existed. In commanding officer when a telephone call commanders to the filght Preparations Office (Biroul Programari Pentru Zbor) in Sucharest was received notifying the CO to cancel all scheduled training flights that night and to alert the air base against a foreign aircraft which was crossing into Rumania from Bulgaria. Bucharest was notified of the aircraft by Bulgaria. Source believes that the Flight Preparations Office in Bucharest was responsible for notifying all airfields in

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alert situations. Source heard nothing further about the fate of penetrating sircraft.

1. Comment: The word "model" possibly denotes that the "polygon" was in an experimental stage and would eventually develope into a pattern for other training sites.



